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4HH, UKAbstract—Human psychophysics is the quantitative mea-
surement of our own perceptions. In essence, it is simply
a more sophisticated version of what humans have done
since time immemorial: noticed and reﬂected upon what
we can see, hear, and feel. In the 21st century, when hugely
powerful techniques are available that enable us to probe
the innermost structure and function of nervous systems,
is human psychophysics still relevant? I argue that it is,
and that in combination with other techniques, it will
continue to be a key part of neuroscience for the foreseeable
future. I discuss these points in detail using the example of
binocular stereopsis, where human psychophysics in
combination with physiology and computational vision,
has made a substantial contribution.
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INTRODUCTION
From ancient times, observing our own sensations and
perceptions has been the most important way of
learning about our body and mind. At its most basic, thishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2014.05.036
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116is how we observe that our eyes are essential for
seeing, the ears for hearing and so on. More subtly,
Aristotle (350BC) described several perceptual illusions,
including retinal after-images and the motion after-eﬀect,
now a staple of psychology and neuroscience (Sekuler,
1965). But it was in the nineteenth century that this folk
psychology became formalized into detailed measure-
ments of human perception. Galileo, Kepler and Newton
had demonstrated with stunning success that the physical
world was subject to laws that explained the observed
regularities in the cosmos. Scientists now began to
search for similar laws governing human perception; in
Fechner’s bold phrase, ‘‘an exact science of the relations
between body and soul’’1 (Fechner, 1860). Many, such as
Ernst Mach, Hermann von Helmholtz or Fechner himself,
were distinguished physicists as well as psychologists or
(what we would now call) neuroscientists. Whereas Aris-
totle had simply noted the motion after-eﬀect as a quaint
phenomenon, these scientists now began to construct
theories of what it might imply about the inner workings of
the brain.
They were remarkably successful in their endeavor.
Weber’s observation that the just-noticeable diﬀerence
between two weights is proportional to the weight itself
(Weber, 1846) encapsulates a profound truth about how
the nervous system encodes information; although there
are deviations, the basic observation applies to a vast
range of phenomena in areas including timing and
number as well as touch, vision and hearing (Stevens,
1957; Whittle, 1986; Killeen and Weiss, 1987; Dehaene,
2003). Wheatstone (1838) discovered binocular stereop-
sis, the sensation of depth produced by small disparities
between the images seen by the two eyes. Surprisingly,
this phenomenon had been missed by earlier research-
ers, such as Leonardo da Vinci (1835 (1651)), who had
studied why it is that pictures appear ﬂat even when the
perspective is correct. Wheatstone’s discovery implied
the existence of structures within the brain sensitive to
binocular disparity, 130 years before such neurons were
identiﬁed (Barlow et al., 1967; Nikara et al., 1968).
Young (1802) famously deduced the trichromatic nature
of human vision, despite having no knowledge of the three
cone types, and nearly two centuries before human
physiological cone spectra were ﬁnally measured – also
using psychophysics (Wald, 1964). Fig. 1 comparesrg/licenses/by/3.0/).
1 ‘‘eine exacte Lehre von den Beziehungen zwischen Leib und
Seele‘‘, Foreword to Elemente der Psychophysik.
Fig. 1. An early success of psychophysics. Although Helmholtz had no knowledge of the diﬀerent cone types, and the diﬀerent roles played by rods
and cones were unclear, the sensitivities he sketched for the putative three color sensors (colored lines) agree rather well with subsequent
measurements, given that he assigns the green color sensors the absorption spectra of rods. The underlying ﬁgure, showing black curves with
symbols, is reproduced from Bowmaker and Dartnall (1980), Fig. 2. The colored curves superimposed are redrawn from Fig. 119 of Helmholtz
(1867), p. 292. The vertical lines mark colors that Helmholtz labeled violet, blue, green, yellow, orange and red. On p. 269, Helmholtz gives the
wavelengths for the boundaries separating these colors, in nm. I have used these to align his curves with the axes.
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(1980) with the sensitivities sketched by Helmholtz in
1867. The agreement is impressive considering how little
physiology was known at the time.WHAT IS PSYCHOPHYSICS?
Psychophysics has been deﬁned as ‘‘the analysis of
perceptual processes by studying the eﬀect on a
subject’s experience or behavior of systematically varying
the properties of a stimulus along one or more physical
dimensions’’ (Bruce et al., 1996). While the techniques of
psychophysics can be applied in a variety of domains,
‘‘classic’’ psychophysics has concentrated on the early
sensory system. This is the area I shall concentrate on in
this review. Furthermore, reﬂecting my own limited knowl-
edge and experience, I shall draw most of my examples
fromvision, and speciﬁcallymyownareaof binocular depth
perception or stereopsis.
The nineteenth-century psychophysicists still often
used introspection rather than reporting quantitative
measurements. Helmholtz’ (1867) magnum opus con-
tains no psychometric functions or similar data that would
pass muster in a modern paper. Rather, the book is pep-
pered with informal observations by the great man, includ-
ing some charming anecdotes such as this on size
perception: ‘‘I still remember once, as a boy, passing by
a church tower (the garrison church in Potsdam) and see-
ing people on its gallery who I thought were dolls. I asked
my mother to fetch them down for me, which at the time I
believed she would be able to do if she stretched out her
arm.’’2 Helmholtz describes his and others’ experiments,2 ‘‘Ich selbst entsinne mich noch, dass ich als Kind an einem
Kirchthurm (der Garnisonskirche zu Potsdam) voru¨bergegangen bin
und auf dessen Gallerie Menschen sah, die ich fu¨r Pu¨ppchen hielt, und
dass ich meine Mutter bat sie mir herunterzulangen, was, wie ich
damals glaubte, sie ko¨nnen wu¨rde, wenn sie den Arm ausstreckte.’’
Helmholtz (1867) p. 624.not presenting the data, but inviting the reader to check
them against his own experience. This illustrates another
key assumption of much psychophysics: that it examines
the most basic, fundamental aspects of human perception,
common to all normally-functioning humans, rather than
more subtle aspects of human experience that might ﬂuctu-
ate within or between individuals. To this day, this assump-
tion underpins the very small number of subjects often used
in psychophysical studies.
However, modern psychophysics generally requires
objective, quantitative judgments rather than verbal
report or introspection. At the heart of all modern
psychophysics is the psychometric function, where a
quantitative aspect of the stimulus is related to the
probability of a particular judgment. This is often used to
extract a threshold, at which the probability of a correct
judgment exceeds some particular level. Psychophysics
is almost always combined with a mathematical
framework such as signal detection theory. A classic
example is the Weber/Fechner law mentioned above as
one of the earliest successes of the ﬁeld. Weber (1846)
observed that the just-noticeable diﬀerence between two
physical stimuli, say the minimum diﬀerence in luminance
required for one light to be perceived as brighter than the
other, tends to be constant when expressed as a percent-
age of the reference stimulus. Fechner (1860) explained
this as follows. We postulate that the neural signal repre-
senting brightness depends on the logarithm of lumi-
nance, and is furthermore subject to internal noise,
which we assume is Gaussian and independent of the sig-
nal. The perceived brightness of the dimmer light is there-
fore a random variable with mean log(L) and standard
deviation r; the perceived brightness of the other light
has mean log(L + dL) and the same standard deviation.
The diﬀerence in perceived brightness is thus a random
variable with mean log(L + dL)–log(L), or approximately
dL/L, and standard deviation r
p
2. The probability that
the brighter light is correctly identiﬁed is simply the
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0.5(1 + erf(dL/(2Lr))), where erf is the error function,
erf(x)=(2/
p
p)
R
0
xexp(t2)dt. The luminance increment
required for 75% correct performance is then
dLthresh = 0.95rL. This postulate both accounts for the
observation that luminance threshold dLthresh increases
with test luminance L, and enables us to estimate the
level of internal noise. Fechner traces his idea back to
Bernoulli (1954 (1738)) and to Laplace, (1812), who pos-
tulated a logarithmic relationship between a physical good
(fortune physique) and its psychological beneﬁt or utility to
the observer (fortune morale).
As this example illustrates, right from its inception
psychophysics has made postulates about the
underlying neuronal mechanisms relating physical
stimuli to perception. These include how sensory
information is encoded (for example, the logarithmic
relation in the above example), how this is aﬀected by
various sources of noise, how the activity of sensory
neurons is converted into a perceptual judgment (e.g.
via a decision criterion), and so on. Concepts such as
decision variable (the diﬀerence in log luminance in the
example above) and utility, originally developed in
human psychophysics, have provided a language for
describing the internal workings of the brain (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007). As will emerge throughout this review,
our increasing physiological knowledge is enabling mod-
ern psychophysics to make ever more detailed postulates
about neuronal mechanisms.
In order to make these inferences, psychophysics
uses a toolbox of techniques for measuring human
perceptions (Gescheider, 1997; Ehrenstein and
Ehrenstein, 1999), many developed by the pioneers of
the ﬁeld but given new power by digital computers. In
the Method of Adjustment, the subject adjusts one stimu-
lus until it appears the same as another. In the Method of
Constant Stimuli, a ﬁxed set of parameter values is cho-
sen – for example, a ﬁxed set of luminance increments
{dLi} – and repeatedly presented in a random order. A
function, such as 0.5(1 + erf(dL/(2Lr))), is then ﬁtted to
the set of data, and used to deduce quantities of interest,
in this example the internal noise r. With the advent of
digital computers, it is easy to interleave diﬀerent experi-
mental conditions at random in order to minimize the
eﬀects of expectation, fatigue or out-and-out cheating by
the subject.
Computers also enable automated staircase
procedures, which oﬀer a particularly quick and
convenient way of extracting thresholds and other
parameters where there is a monotonic relationship
between the experimental parameter and task diﬃculty
(Dixon and Mood, 1948). Staircase procedures typically
start with a large value of the parameter, designed to
make the task easy. The parameter is reduced until the
person makes an error, at which point the parameter is
increased again. In this way, by stepping up and down
an imaginary staircase, the procedure gradually homes
in on the threshold level of performance. There is a large
body of work examining diﬀerent mathematical recipes for
adjusting the staircase (Watson and Pelli, 1983; Bernstein
and Gravel, 1990; Johnson et al., 1992; King-Smith et al.,1994; Treutwein, 1995; Snoeren and Puts, 1997;
Treutwein and Strasburger, 1999; Shen, 2013). Stair-
cases work well in tasks like contrast detection or lumi-
nance discrimination. However, they can fail
catastrophically if task diﬃculty is a non-monotonic
parameter of interest. For example, judgments of relative
depth from binocular disparity are hard if the disparity is
near-zero, become easier as the disparity is increased
up to around half a degree, and subsequently become
hard or impossible as excessive disparities cause double
vision and a loss of the depth percept.
As well as examining the precision of human
perception, psychophysics can also reveal its accuracy.
Psychophysicists are fascinated by illusions, where
human perception does not veridically represent the
world. A famous example is the Ebbinghaus illusion,
where a circle surrounded by larger (smaller) circles
appears smaller (larger) than it really is. Illusions are
informative because a veridical perception simply tells
us that our perceptual systems are well adapted to their
job of representing the world, whereas a system’s
failures can reveal how it is constructed. However,
illusions often take the form of ‘‘biases’’, such as the
size bias in the Ebbinghaus illusion, and measuring
these can be tricky. Morgan et al. (2013) have recently
argued that many experimental approaches confound
response biases (e.g. a tendency to press the left button
when in doubt), decisional biases (e.g. a tendency to
respond ‘‘bigger’’ when in doubt), and genuine perceptual
biases (e.g. the tendency to perceive a circle as bigger
when it is surrounded by small circles). They argue that
by designing experiments appropriately, it is possible to
dissect out these diﬀerent forms of bias. In terms of signal
detection theory, this enables the psychophysicist to dis-
tinguish between a shift in the signal function and a shift
in the decision criterion. In terms of neuronal mecha-
nisms, these correspond to a change in how sensory neu-
rons encode the physical stimulus, and a change in how
higher brain areas decode the response of a population
of sensory neurons.
Deductions about neuronal mechanisms can also be
made by comparing how performance varies across
individuals. If thresholds on tasks A and B are
correlated between individuals whereas those on tasks
C and D are not, this suggests that the brain areas
subserving A and B may overlap more than those
subserving C and D. Perhaps surprisingly, these
techniques have been little exploited within pure
psychophysics. Several individual-diﬀerences studies
have related a psychophysical measurement, e.g.
threshold, to a physiological measurement e.g. cerebral
blood ﬂow (Kosslyn et al., 2002). Nefs et al. (2010) is a
rare example of correlating thresholds on diﬀerent psy-
chophysical tasks, used in their case to deduce that
humans possess two independent mechanisms for
detecting motion in depth.
As noted above, much psychophysics has been
directed at uncovering fundamental mechanisms shared
by all humans. Given this assumption, and the fact
that experiments may require hours of painstaking
observation, human psychophysics papers often use
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This is often surprising to scientists from other ﬁelds, and
seems at odds with the generally rigorous approach laid
out above. Can a paper reporting data from 4 subjects
really tell us anything general about humanity? My own
research area of binocular stereopsis is one where there
seems to be a particularly large amount of individual
variation, so small studies can be misleading. For
example, a paper examining sensitivity to vertical
disparity, using 3 subjects, concluded that ‘‘sensations
of depth are not elicited by modulations of vertical-size
disparity of any amplitude at spatial frequencies higher
than about 0.04 c/deg’’ and that the sensitivity function
was low-pass, suggesting that the brain does not
contain mechanisms tuned to modulations in vertical-
size disparity (Kaneko and Howard, 1997). A subsequent
paper with 9 subjects found similar results for 3 subjects,
but the other 6 subjects showed bandpass sensitivity and
a weak sensation of depth up to frequencies four times
higher than the previous study (Serrano-Pedraza et al.,
2010). This suggests that some people possess mecha-
nisms tuned to modulations in vertical disparity while oth-
ers do not. There are also conﬂicting results that do not
appear to be due to under-sampling. For example, the
‘‘anti-correlated random-dot stereogram’’, which presents
opposite contrast to the two eyes, has been inﬂuential in
developing theories of cortical depth encoding (reviewed
by Read (2005)). In order to understand how information
in primary visual cortex relates to perception, it is impor-
tant to understand what percept is caused by this stimu-
lus, but the results are conﬂicting. Several labs have
found that such images cause no perception of depth
(Julesz, 1960; Cogan et al., 1993; Cumming et al.,
1998), even when dozens of subjects are tested
(Hibbard et al., 2014), whereas others have reported that
under some circumstances, some observers see
reversed depth (Read and Eagle, 2000; Tanabe et al.,
2008; Doi et al., 2011; Doi et al., 2013). The reason for
these discrepancies is not clear. It is probably not coinci-
dence, however, that both these examples relate to highly
unnatural and diﬃcult stimuli, which create only a weak
depth percept in the most sensitive observers. In general,
my impression is that the techniques that characterize
perceptual psychophysics – objective reports, randomly
interleaved presentations controlled by computer, rigor-
ous ﬁtting based on well-understood mathematics – do
generally ensure good reproducibility. The Open Science
Framework (https://osf.io/ezcuj/) has recently launched
the Reproducibility Project: Psychology, which aims to
systematically replicate selected psychology publications
(Carpenter, 2012; Yong, 2012). Over time, this project
should reveal how well psychophysics is living up to its
ideals.
A further advantage of the move away from
introspection and toward rigorous techniques using
quantitative reports is that it has made psychophysics
possible in animals as well as humans. Animal
psychophysics may exploit a spontaneous behavior such
as the optokinetic/optomotor response (McCann and
MacGinitie, 1965), or require extensive training (Pavlov,
1927; Skinner, 1933). The use of animals enables the neu-ronal activity underlying perception to be probed in detail.
Modern neuroscience has a plethora of techniques at its
disposal. Current ﬂow or voltage change in an individual
neuron can be recorded; spikes ﬁred by scores of neurons
can be recorded simultaneously; optogenetic techniques
allow speciﬁc classes of neurons to be activated or inacti-
vated at will. Concepts originally derived from behavioral
or psychophysical studies, such as the decision variable
or utility discussed above, are now probed at the level of
single neurons (Barlow, 1972; Parker and Newsome,
1998; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013).
Animal studies are particularly valuable because they
enable physiology and psychophysics to be used
simultaneously in the same organism. However,
nowadays neuroscientists also have access to a wide
range of non-invasive techniques that allow coarser
access to neural anatomy and physiology in living
humans. To electrical and magnetic encephalography
have been added functional near infra-red spectroscopy,
structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging,
diﬀusion tensor imaging to track white matter tracts, and
transcranial magnetic stimulation to brieﬂy alter the
functioning of speciﬁc cortical areas.
Given these developments, even a reader who accepts
the huge contributionmadebyhumanpsychophysics in the
past might reasonably wonder if it has a place in the future.
One canquery both the ‘‘human’’ and the ‘‘psychophysics’’:
in humans, will psychophysics remain valuable, as
opposed to other techniques such as neuro-imaging?
And if psychophysics remains an important technique,
will it continue to be done in humans as opposed to
experimental animals where results can be directly
compared with invasive physiology? I argue that there
are several reasons why human psychophysics will
remain a fundamental tool of neuroscience.THE CONTINUING ROLE OF HUMAN
PSYCHOPHYSICS
As noted above, animal psychophysics has particular
value because we can directly relate neuronal activity to
perceptual judgments. Despite this, human
psychophysics has several advantages over the animal
variety which assure its continued importance. Perhaps
most fundamentally, human psychophysics tells us
directly about the species we are most interested in.
Some human abilities (language, abstract reasoning)
may not even exist in other species, or not to the same
degree. Even where the abilities exist in other species,
human psychophysics experiments can exploit complex
tasks that would be diﬃcult or impossible without verbal
instruction. For example, one recent paper examined
‘‘electrophysiological correlates of anxious rumination’’
by comparing electroencephalography (EEG) signals
measured while participants performed a neutral
counting task versus while they ruminated on a personal
conﬂict in their own life (Andersen et al., 2009). It is hard
to see how such an experiment could be carried out in a
lab animal, even if the species was capable of anxious
rumination. These sorts of more complex tasks are likely
to become more important in the future, as the ﬁeld
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higher brain areas. A second point worth highlighting is
that human subjects can give verbally more complex
responses than are possible in animals, for example
reporting their qualitative sensations. Admittedly, this abil-
ity is little exploited in the sort of classic sensory psycho-
physics I am discussing in this review.
Even where an animal can apparently be trained to
perform a task, it is diﬃcult to be sure that the animal is
in fact reporting what the experimenter hopes it is. It
may be attending to a diﬀerent aspect of the stimulus,
perhaps even an artifact the experimenter is not aware
of. Perceptual thresholds in animals may reﬂect the
eﬀect of motivation, for example trading oﬀ a low but
acceptable reward rate in return for lower attentional
load, rather than true sensory limits. These are valid
concerns in humans too, but human participants will
generally communicate such problems.
Furthermore, the extensive training necessary to
teach lab animals what is required of them may in itself
alter the neuronal substrate under study (Chowdhury
and DeAngelis, 2008; Hua et al., 2010). That is, it may
change the low-level neuronal circuits representing the
sensory information as well as the high-level circuits rep-
resenting the animal’s understanding of and motivation to
do the task. The brain areas involved when a highly
trained animal carries out a task on which it has per-
formed hundreds of trials may be very diﬀerent from those
subserving such tasks before training. For a similar rea-
son, animal studies of perceptual learning can be hard
to interpret, because of the diﬃculty of distinguishing per-
ceptual learning from simple task learning.
Last but not least, the ‘‘3Rs’’, the principles of
Replacement, Reduction and Reﬁnement (Russell et al.,
1992), mandate that animal experiments should be car-
ried out only when necessary. Experiments should there-
fore be done in humans whenever possible.
These are all reasons, then, why we need to study
humans as well as animals. But one might wonder
whether the powerful new techniques mentioned above
supersede traditional psychophysics. Perhaps nowadays
we should conﬁne ourselves to measuring human brain
activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) or magnetoencephalography (MEG), rather than
inferring it via psychophysics. Does psychophysics in
any species still have value for understanding the brain?
I would argue that it does. The ultimate goal of
neuroscience is to understand the biological basis of our
thoughts and behavior. Within this, a major subgoal is
understanding our own perceptions: how our brains
represent and interpret the world around us.
Psychophysics asks an individual to make quantitative
reports about their perception of a stimulus, and
examines how these reports change as a function of the
physical properties of the stimulus. In other words, it
probes the input/output relations of the system under
study. It is hard to imagine a more basic approach, or
how one could claim to understand any system without
ﬁrst measuring these relations.
Of course, we have amassed a large body of
knowledge about how humans perceive stimuli. But thisdoes not mean that psychophysics is now over. Rather,
our growing knowledge about brain mechanisms is
prompting new psychophysical experiments designed to
probe more subtle questions. New technologies such as
fMRI or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have
supplemented rather than replaced psychophysics.
Studies using these new techniques in humans routinely
pair them with psychophysical measurements that greatly
increase their power. Below, I give speciﬁc examples of
such interactions between physiology and psychophysics.
On a less exalted level but of considerable practical
importance, human psychophysics is generally much
quicker, easier and cheaper than either non-human
psychophysics or other techniques in humans. So
human psychophysics can be used to map out the
nature of the phenomena to be explained, providing
valuable guidance for subsequent work using other
techniques. For example, human fMRI generally
investigates phenomena that have been previously
established using psychophysics alone.
Human psychophysics is continuing to make major
contributions to one of my own particular areas of
interest: stereoscopic vision, and in particular the
constraints placed upon our stereoscopic vision by the
initial encoding in binocular disparity in primary visual
cortex (V1). By deﬁnition, the properties of V1 are a
matter for neurophysiology, so by its nature this has
required close collaboration between human
psychophysics and physiology. These techniques are
sometimes combined within a single study, sometimes
applied separately, and many diﬀerent groups have
contributed to this ongoing project. In the next section, I
review the progress made in this area. Along the way, I
hope to highlight the distinctive contribution made by
human psychophysics, illustrating the general points
made in this section.LINKING NEURONS TO HUMAN PERCEPTION
IN STEREOSCOPIC VISION
Binocular stereopsis refers to the perception of depth
based on small disparities between the images seen by
the two eyes. As noted above, its discovery was itself
an early triumph of the new discipline of psychophysics.
Stereopsis was studied by many nineteenth-century
luminaries, including Hering and Helmholtz. Notable
advances included Helmholtz’s work on the horopter
(points in space that appear at the same location when
viewed monocularly in either eye) and his demonstration
that vertical disparities are used to calibrate the depth
percept due to horizontal disparity. A century later,
human psychophysics provided a second major
breakthrough which revitalized the ﬁeld and prompted
new avenues of research in psychophysics,
neurophysiology and computational neuroscience. This
was Julesz’s (1960) demonstration that stereopsis does
not require a monocularly-visible object, but can work on
‘‘cyclopean’’ stimuli in which structure is deﬁned purely
by the oﬀsets between the two eyes. Julesz (1978)
dubbed this ability ‘‘global stereopsis’’, on the grounds
that local features are ambiguous, so a successful match
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structure over relatively large scales. This ability proves
that at least one form of stereopsis precedes object
recognition.
This demonstration immediately made stereopsis an
attractive model system to neuroscientists seeking to
understand the relationship between cortical
computations and perception. Neurons in the lateral
geniculate nucleus of the thalamus receive their primary
innervation from only one eye, and although there are
binocular interactions (Marrocco and McClurkin, 1979;
Schroeder et al., 1990), thalamic neurons appear not to
be tuned for disparity (Xue et al., 1987). Therefore, it
seems likely that the neuronal mechanisms subserving
stereo vision must begin in primary visual cortex, the ﬁrst
place in the visual pathway where neurons tuned to dis-
parity are found. This makes stereopsis an interesting
candidate for studying speciﬁcally cortical algorithms. Sci-
entists since Isaac Newton had already used degree of
interocular transfer as a way of assessing whether a par-
ticular phenomenon was supported by cerebral structures
(if not always with impeccable logic; Day (1958)). The
advent of cyclopean stimuli facilitated this by enabling
the presentation of stimuli that were only visible to the cor-
tex. Cyclopean stimuli also enable depth from binocular
stereopsis to be examined in isolation, without the other
depth cues that normally accompany it, such as texture,
shading, occlusion, motion parallax and perspective cues.
Stimuli such as dynamic random-dot stereograms there-
fore became a staple of stereo psychophysics.
Furthermore, Julesz’s demonstration that global
stereopsis does not require recognizable objects
suggested that the algorithm used by the cortex to
detect such stimuli must be simple and low-level, the
sort of algorithm that could potentially be understood
and implemented in a machine. Computational
neuroscientists were quick to come up with candidates
(Dev, 1975; Marr and Poggio, 1976; Marr et al., 1978;
Marr and Poggio, 1979). As Julesz pointed out, his use
of cyclopean stimuli shifted the direction of the whole ﬁeld:
away from trying to understand the relationship between
binocular disparity and perceived depth, and toward
understanding how binocular disparity is extracted in the
ﬁrst place (Julesz, 1964). This piece of human psycho-
physics therefore set the agenda in this area of neurosci-
ence for decades to come.
In the years following Julesz’s demonstration of global
stereopsis, neurons tuned to binocular disparity were
identiﬁed in a range of species: cat (Barlow et al., 1967;
Nikara et al., 1968; Pettigrew et al., 1968; Nelson et al.,
1977; Fischer and Krueger, 1979), monkey (Zeki, 1974;
Poggio and Fischer, 1977), sheep (Clarke et al., 1976)
and owl (Pettigrew, 1979). These early studies followed
in the tradition set by Hubel & Wiesel of using bar stimuli,
which are of course monocularly visible objects. However,
Julesz’s work was rapidly followed up in monkey psycho-
physics, and within two years of his original report, it had
been shown that monkeys too possess global stereopsis
(Bough, 1970). It is perhaps surprising that it took another
ﬁfteen years for a published demonstration that neurons
in monkey V1 were sensitive to disparity in cyclopeanstimuli (Poggio et al., 1985; Poggio et al., 1988) as well
as in traditional stimuli like bars. This strongly implicated
these neurons as playing a role in the brain’s algorithm
for global stereopsis (Poggio and Poggio, 1984; Poggio,
1990), raising the possibility that could be regarded as
analogous to photoreceptors with V1 as the ‘‘cyclopean
retina’’ for global stereopsis, a term introduced by Julesz
(1971) to refer to the putative processing site in the cortex
that extracts disparity from such stimuli.
In turn, this physiology was soon being used to
develop new computational models, notably the stereo
energy model (Ohzawa, 1998). This model was devel-
oped in cat (Ohzawa et al., 1990), but its predictions were
soon being tested and conﬁrmed in monkey (Cumming
and Parker, 1997). This test exploited another tool devel-
oped in human psychophysics: the anti-correlated stereo-
gram introduced above (Anstis and Rogers, 1975; Rogers
and Anstis, 1975; Cogan et al., 1993).
More recently, the neuronal basis of stereopsis in
humans has been examined using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (Backus et al., 2001; Gilaie-Dotan
et al., 2002; Negawa et al., 2002; Tsao et al., 2003; Neri
et al., 2004; Bridge and Parker, 2007; Likova and Tyler,
2007; Preston et al., 2008; Spang and Morgan, 2008).
These kinds of studies are guided and informed by the
established human psychophysics, and very often they
combine cortical imaging with human psychophysics in
their experiments. For example, Backus et al. (2001) used
this approach to demonstrate that ‘‘measured cortical
activity covaried with psychophysical measures of stereo-
scopic depth perception’’. This exempliﬁes a point made
above: by combining their fMRI recording with psycho-
physics, Backus et al. strengthened their power to draw
conclusions about the signiﬁcance of the cortical activity
they measured.
As discussed above, psychophysics has always been
concerned to relate human perception to underlying
neuronal mechanisms, via mathematical models or
linking hypotheses (Morgan et al., 2013). This relationship
has been particularly close in the area of stereoscopic
vision, perhaps because the detection of binocular dispar-
ity occurs later in the visual pathway, and thus closer to
perceptual experience, than the detection of light. In the
following paragraphs, I will brieﬂy review several aspects
of human stereoscopic vision and discuss our current
understanding of the underlying neuronal mechanisms.Stereoacuity
Psychophysics has always been much occupied with the
study of thresholds: the dimmest light or smallest tilt
perceivable. In the context of stereopsis, this
corresponds to stereoacuity: the smallest depth step
detectable from binocular disparities. This is much
smaller than the spacing of photoreceptors in the retina.
What feature of neural circuitry sets this limit?
Poggio and Poggio (1984) initially noted that the
coarse stereoacuity implied by the tuning curves of mon-
key V1 neurons did not accord with the ﬁne stereoacuity
of human or monkey observers: ‘‘The threshold of ste-
reoacuity is more than one order of magnitude smaller
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course, it may be naı¨ve to compare the sensitivity of an
individual neuron to that of the whole organism, which
contains many thousands of such neurons. Yet there
are some tasks on which the sensitivity of individual neu-
rons does closely match that of the organism (Britten
et al., 1992). There are several reasons for the discrep-
ancy noted by Poggio & Poggio.
First, we now know that cells in V1 encode absolute
disparity (Cumming and Parker, 1999), whereas the
exquisitely low stereo thresholds achieved by human
observers require relative disparity (Westheimer, 1979).
Cells selective for relative disparity are not observed until
V2 (von der Heydt et al., 2000; Thomas et al., 2002). This
is an example of how psychophysics enables us to inter-
pret physiological measures of neuronal function, in this
case implying that we should compare the tuning of V1
neurons with human thresholds for absolute, not relative,
disparity.
However, the tuning width of V1 neurons is still wide
even compared with the sensitivity of human observers
to absolute disparity. For example, the absolute
disparity thresholds we measured in one recent paper
were about 0.04o for long-duration stimuli and 0.08o for
stimuli presented for just 160 ms (Read et al. (2010),
Supp Mat), whereas the width of typical V1 disparity-tun-
ing curves is around 0.5 (Poggio et al., 1985; Poggio
et al., 1988; Prince et al., 2002b). A further complication
is the fact that V1 neurons are not usually recorded at
the fovea itself, but may be at several degrees eccentric-
ity; stereoacuity declines rapidly as stimuli move out from
the fovea (Rawlings and Shipley, 1969). Furthermore,
monkey stereoacuity may not be as good as human.
Prince et al. (2000) addressed many of these issues
by speciﬁcally comparing psychometric and neurometric
functions in the same animal for relative-disparity judg-
ments at the appropriate eccentricity. They concluded
that the best V1 neurons were as sensitive or better than
the animals themselves, although the average neuronal
threshold was four times poorer than the average psycho-
physical threshold. That is, psychophysical stereoacuity
does seem to be accounted for by the properties of neu-
rons in V1, when comparisons are made for the same
species and eccentricity. In agreement with this picture,
disparity-tuning curves in ventral areas like IT are not sub-
stantially sharper than in V1, even though these areas
seem to be more directly related to depth perception
(Janssen et al., 1999; Uka et al., 2000; Janssen et al.,
2003; Uka et al., 2005).
Disparity range
Stereoscopic vision is unusual in that there is not only a
threshold but a ceiling: both a minimum and a maximum
detectable disparity. Disparities beyond about 0.5 lie
outside the fusible range (Panum, 1858), and do not result
in a depth percept in cyclopean stimuli. This psychophys-
ical limit agrees very well with the observed range of dis-
parity tuning in monkey V1. The preferred disparities of
monkey V1 neurons are generally less than 0.5, with
very few neurons selective for disparities over 1, even
at an eccentricity of 5 (Prince et al., 2002a).Size-disparity correlation
Several psychophysical studies have found evidence for a
‘‘size-disparity correlation’’, meaning that larger
disparities are encoded by sensors with larger receptive
ﬁelds (Felton et al., 1972; Tyler, 1973, 1974, 1975;
Smallman and MacLeod, 1994; Tsirlin et al., 2008). Com-
putational neuroscientists have also proposed a similar
relationship on theoretical grounds: if sensors tuned to lar-
ger disparities are also tuned to larger spatial scales, they
are less likely to respond to false matches between the
left and right-eye images (Marr and Poggio, 1979). This
size-disparity correlation emerges naturally from the class
of model known as phase-based (Sanger, 1988; Ohzawa
et al., 1990; Qian, 1994). Although stereo vision is not lim-
ited to purely phase-based encoding (Prince and Eagle,
1999; Prince and Eagle, 2000; Prince et al., 2002a), there
is some physiological evidence for such a relationship. V1
neurons tuned to small disparities are found at all spatial
scales, but cells tuned to the largest disparities tend to be
those with the largest scales (Prince et al., 2002a). This is
an interesting example, because the size-disparity corre-
lation is widely accepted based on computational model-
ing of psychophysical data, despite the relatively weak
physiological evidence supporting it.Temporal stereoresolution
Temporal resolution for disparity is very low: human
observers can perceive variations in disparity only up to
around 5 Hz (Norcia and Tyler, 1984; Lankheet and
Lennie, 1996; Kane et al., 2014), an order of magnitude
lower than the threshold for ﬂicker fusion (Kelly, 1971).
This agrees reasonably well with the properties of V1 neu-
rons. Macaque V1 neurons modulate their ﬁring rates to
track temporal modulations in disparity up to around
10 Hz (Nienborg et al., 2005), even though they track vari-
ations in contrast up to much higher frequencies. Nien-
borg et al. point out that this loss of resolution is an
interesting mathematical consequence of comparing
inputs from the two eyes. Unfortunately, there are as yet
no psychophysical data on temporal stereoresolution in
macaques. We do not know, therefore, whether maca-
ques can perceive temporal modulation in disparity up
to the frequencies suggested by their V1 neurons, which
at 10 Hz is somewhat higher than most humans.Spatial resolution
Stereo vision has also much coarser spatial resolution
than luminance. Humans are able to detect variation in
luminance on a scale of 50 cycles per degree or higher
(Campbell and Green, 1965), yet we can detect variation
in disparity only up to around 4 cycles per degree (Tyler,
1974; Bradshaw and Rogers, 1999). The low spatial ste-
reo resolution appears to reﬂect the size of receptive
ﬁelds in V1. This is not the case for luminance, because
V1 receptive ﬁelds have ON and OFF subregions which
make them sensitive to variations in luminance across
the receptive ﬁeld. In contrast, V1 neurons respond best
to uniform disparity (Nienborg et al., 2004). The minimum
response ﬁelds of primate V1 neurons near the fovea are
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standard deviation around 0.1. The Fourier transform of
such a Gaussian is a low-pass function falling to 5% of
its peak value at 4 cycles per degree (Nienborg et al.,
2004). Thus, the size of monkey V1 receptive ﬁelds
accords well with the observed stereoresolution of human
observers (Lankheet and Lennie, 1996; Banks et al.,
2004; Allenmark and Read, 2011; Kane et al., 2014). Of
course, this relies on a cross-species comparison. It
would be preferable to relate the sensitivity of V1 neurons
to disparity corrugations directly to an observer’s ability to
detect disparity gratings at the same eccentricity. In terms
of stereoacuity, macaque thresholds are very similar to
human (Prince et al., 2000), including when the stimuli
have an interocular delay (Read and Cumming, 2005).
Again, no study has directly compared neurometric and
psychophysical thresholds for spatial modulation of
disparity.
Our ability to detect spatial depth corrugations is
subject to a disparity gradient limit: we cannot see
changes more rapid than about 1 disparity per degree
visual angle (Tyler, 1975; Burt and Julesz, 1980; McKee
and Verghese, 2002; Banks et al., 2004; Filippini and
Banks, 2009; Kane et al., 2014). Banks and colleagues
(Banks et al., 2004; Filippini and Banks, 2009) have
developed a computational model which shows how the
disparity gradient limit arises naturally from the above-
mentioned properties of V1 neurons. The original model
predicts that the disparity gradient limit should not apply
to square-wave disparity corrugations, since their dispar-
ity is locally constant. If a square-wave corrugation is vis-
ible at a particular frequency at low amplitude, the model
predicts it will remain visible as the disparity amplitude
increases up to the fusional limit. This prediction is not
borne out by human psychophysics (Allenmark and
Read, 2010). However, the original model took no
account of the size-disparity correlation discussed above.
If the model is adjusted so as to include this, then square-
wave corrugations with larger disparity amplitudes are
detected by sensors with larger receptive ﬁelds and thus
coarser spatial resolution. The modiﬁed model now
agrees well with human psychophysics (Allenmark and
Read, 2011). This is a good example of how human psy-
chophysics, animal physiology and computational neuro-
science can all contribute to a cycle of progressively
reﬁned understanding.
As we have seen, then, the properties of macaque V1
neurons closely explain the limits of human observers in
several aspects of stereoscopic vision. It is worth
pointing out that there are other aspects where this has
not yet been demonstrated. For example, Prince et al.
(2000) examined two other well-known results from
human psychophysics: the decline in stereoacuity with
eccentricity (Rawlings and Shipley, 1969) and with pedes-
tal disparity (Blakemore, 1970); that is, the disparity sep-
aration required to discriminate two objects increases with
their distance from ﬁxation both in the visual ﬁeld and in
depth. Prince et al. were not able to account for this in
their neuronal data; for example, neurometric thresholds
were not correlated with receptive ﬁeld eccentricity. As
they point out, this could simply be because the relation-ship was swamped by other sources of variation in their
data. It remains to be seen whether a relationship
between neurometric threshold and eccentricity will be
demonstrated in the future, or whether there is a diﬀerent
neuronal basis for the psychophysical eﬀect. For exam-
ple, we know that the distribution of preferred disparity
in V1 is centered on near-zero disparities (Prince et al.,
2002a). If neurons sensitive to disparity edges in higher
visual areas are constructed by combining outputs of suit-
able V1 neurons (Bredfeldt et al., 2009), we would expect
this to result in more neurons tuned to near-zero pedestal
disparities. Analogously, perhaps greater sensitivity is
achieved near the fovea simply because there are more
disparity-tuned neurons near the fovea and this reduces
the eﬀective noise. Such population-based eﬀects could
not be reﬂected in neurometric thresholds derived from
single neurons, and remain to be demonstrated. New
physiological techniques, such as recording from many
neurons simultaneously using Utah arrays, should enable
psychophysical data to be related more directly to popula-
tion, as well as single-unit, activity.
If V1 is the ﬁrst place where binocular information is
combined, then all stereoscopic information available to
the observer must be available at least implicitly in V1,
just as all monocular information must be available in
the retina. Because disparity is not detected until V1,
there are no extrastriate pathways for stereoscopic
information and presumably, no stereo version of the
blindsight observed in other domains (Weiskrantz,
1986). However, the converse is not true: not all stereo-
scopic information available in V1 is available to the
observer. Stereo vision oﬀers two striking examples.
The ﬁrst concerns the ‘‘anti-correlated random-dot ste-
reograms’’ discussed above in the context of reproduc-
ibility. These produce almost no sensation of depth
(Julesz, 1960; Cogan et al., 1993; Cumming et al.,
1998; Hibbard et al., 2014); even the most sensitive
observers can discriminate depth only about 75% of
the time (Read and Eagle, 2000; Tanabe et al., 2008;
Doi et al., 2011; Doi et al., 2013). In contrast, consider
the cell shown in Fig. 2. A homunculus, or electrophys-
iologist, using this single cell to discriminate surfaces of
±0.1 would be 100% correct for correlated stereo-
grams and 100% wrong for anti-correlated. Although
the disparity of anti-correlated stereograms is reliably
represented in V1, little if any of this information
reaches consciousness. This makes sense, since the
stereo system is looking for ‘‘matches’’ between the
eyes that represent diﬀerent views of the same object.
Real objects do not usually appear black in one eye
and white in the other (and when they do, for example
due to specular reﬂection, there are diﬀerent means of
judging their depth (Muryy et al., 2013)). The stereo
system has to correctly detect the correct matches,
while suppressing the response to false matches, for
example by combining information across spatial scales.
As a side-eﬀect, information contained in anti-correlated
disparities is lost when the population activity is ‘‘read
out’’ to form a depth percept. Thus, studying these
highly unnatural anti-correlated stimuli can constrain
computational models of stereopsis (Read and Eagle,
Fig. 2. A far-type cell from Cumming and Parker (1997). Data show mean ﬁring rate to dynamic random-dot stereograms. Filled symbols/solid curve
are for correlated stimuli; empty symbols/dotted curve for anti-correlated.
Fig. 3. The task is to discriminate a small disparity in the sinusoidal grating (compare circles in the two images). When the edges of the grating are
at the same position in the two eyes (A), observers are very sensitive to this disparity. When the edges have a large disparity that is an integer
multiple of grating periods (B), observers are much less sensitive, even though many disparity-sensitive V1 neurons see identical images, and give
the same response, in both cases.
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et al., 2011; Doi et al., 2013).
The second example is perhaps even more intriguing,
since it is less obviously adaptive. As noted above, human
stereo vision is more precise for depth judgments around
ﬁxation than for those about a pedestal disparity
(Blakemore, 1970). McKee et al. (2005) showed that this
is also true when the stimulus being discriminated is a
sinusoidal grating. This is surprising because a sine-grat-
ing is a periodic stimulus. When the grating is given a
pedestal disparity that is an integer multiple of its period,
nothing changes in the stimulus except the location of
its edges (Fig. 3). The observer perceives the grating at
the depth signaled by the edges (McKee et al., 2004),
and shows the reduction in stereoacuity normally associ-
ated with that depth (McKee et al., 2005). Experiments
using this same stimulus in macaques had already shown
that V1 neurons are not sensitive to the disparity signaled
by the edges, but simply respond to the portion of thegrating falling within their receptive ﬁeld, which is the
same in both cases (Cumming and Parker, 2000).
Assuming that humans and macaques are alike in this,
a neurophysiologist recording from an appropriate V1 cell
would show the same high stereoacuity for gratings, inde-
pendent of the absolute depth signaled by their edges,
whereas the organism itself would become less and less
sensitive as the absolute depth increased. In a subse-
quent paper, McKee et al. (2007) further showed that over
the course of a few seconds, the signal from the edges
adapts and the observer then perceives the grating in
the ﬁxation plane rather than in the plane consistent with
its edges (the wallpaper illusion, Brewster (1844)). The
observer then displays the usual stereoacuity. McKee
et al. concluded that second-order mechanisms which
detect the edge disparities control whether and how visual
awareness is able to access information contained in V1.
These two examples both provide insight into when
and how the activity of sensory neurons results in
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skillful combination of human psychophysics along with
physiology. If visual psychophysics had been
abandoned twenty years ago, such insights would be
impossible.
Many unanswered questions remain concerning the
neuronal mechanisms of stereoscopic depth perception.
Nevertheless, huge progress has been made in the
40 years or so since the discovery of neurons tuned to
binocular disparity. One result is that we can now
identify several areas where perception is fundamentally
constrained by the properties of primary visual cortex.
This is particularly interesting given that in other areas,
e.g. visual acuity or luminance detection, human abilities
are constrained at the periphery, by the retina. Binocular
stereopsis oﬀers a window into constraints imposed
speciﬁcally by the cerebral cortex. I hope that I have
demonstrated the key role played by human
psychophysics throughout this process.CONCLUSION
Marr famously introduced three levels of analysis for
neuronal systems: the computational (what problem
does the system solve), the representational (what
algorithms does it use to solve it) and the physical level
(what neuronal structures implement it). Roughly
speaking, psychophysics aims to study the ﬁrst level,
physiology the third, and computational modeling the
intermediate, algorithmic level which links the two. All
three levels are essential for a complete understanding
of the system, and certainly a detailed knowledge of the
physical level is essential if we wish to intervene in the
system, e.g. through drug therapy. Yet arguably the
computational level is the most fundamental, the one
which people really mean when they ask ‘‘how does the
brain work?’’ By addressing this level, psychophysics
goes to the heart of understanding ourselves.
Physiology is fascinating in its own right, but acquires its
full meaning and signiﬁcance when related to perceptual
experience by psychophysics.
In the ﬁrst part of this article, I spent some time on the
distinguished history of psychophysics. Subsequently in
my review of binocular stereopsis, in every case, the
psychophysical observation came long before evidence
of the neuronal properties which might account for it.
Human psychophysics has set the agenda: in the
discovery ﬁrst of stereopsis and then of ‘‘global
stereopsis’’ and cyclopean stimuli; in the introduction of
complex stimuli such as anti-correlated stereograms;
and in the formation of theories to be tested. While
establishing the primacy of psychophysics, this may
have risked giving the impression that psychophysics
was an early technique that has since been supplanted.
As stated above, I do not believe this is the case: the
new techniques simply give us better tools for building a
psychophysical understanding. In fact, physiology has
constantly stimulated new psychophysics, and vice
versa. As an example of the former, the discovery that
neurons in cortical area MT are tuned both to direction
of motion and to binocular disparity (Maunsell and VanEssen, 1983a,b) led us to examine human spatial resolu-
tion for gratings deﬁned by direction/disparity conjunc-
tions (Allenmark and Read, 2012). As an example of the
latter, the Pulfrich illusion and related observations in
human psychophysics (Pulfrich, 1922; Ross, 1974;
Morgan and Thompson, 1975) led us to record from single
neurons while monkeys viewed random-dot stereograms
with interocular delay, in an attempt to elucidate the neu-
ronal basis of these perceptual phenomena (Read and
Cumming, 2005). These are just two examples of the
continuing ﬂow of ideas and stimuli between the diﬀerent
levels of Marr’s hierarchy.
In this review, I have concentrated on ‘‘classic’’
psychophysics of the early sensory system. I stated that
this probes the input/output relations of the system
under study, but I did not stress the limitations of this
‘‘black box’’ approach. For example, psychophysics has
little to say about how the motor system achieves the
behavioral outputs it measures. Even within the sensory
domain, it can be diﬃcult to say with conﬁdence how
well psychophysical results really constrain the internal
properties of the system, as opposed to, for example,
merely reﬂecting limitations imposed by the choice of
stimulus. Furthermore, classical psychophysics boils
down the complexity of human experience to highly
limited, quantitative judgments. For example, ‘‘forced
choice’’ designs explicitly ignore subject motivation;
requiring binary ‘‘yes/no’’-type judgments deliberately
excludes conﬁdence in the response or the qualitative
nature of the perception. There have been attempts to
bring psychophysical techniques to bear on more
complex aspects of human experience than judging the
relative brightness of lights, for example changes of
mind (Resulaj et al., 2009), social exclusion (DeWall
and Baumeister, 2006) or emotional sensitivity (Martin
et al., 1996). Yet it is true that by excluding the more com-
plex, qualitative aspects of our conscious experience,
psychophysics often ignores what many consider the
most important aspects of being human. The merit of this
approach is that it simpliﬁes the system enough to make it
amenable to mathematical modeling and hypothesis test-
ing. Similar idealizations in physics, though satirized in a
hundred ‘‘spherical cow’’ jokes, have been hugely produc-
tive. As Sir Peter Medawar noted (1981), science is the
art of the soluble. We hope that what we learn by studying
simpliﬁed, abstracted basic perceptual abilities will ulti-
mately help us in understanding more complex abilities
and system properties. For example, the uniform struc-
ture of the cortex all over the brain has long been cited
as evidence that the brain may use a few canonical com-
putations (Douglas et al., 1989; Stevens, 1994; Douglas
and Martin, 2007). Concepts such as normalization
(Carandini and Heeger, 2012), Bayesian networks (Knill
and Richards, 1996; Ripley, 1996), inference by probabi-
listic population codes (Ma et al., 2006), correlated vari-
ability between neurons (Cohen and Kohn, 2011;
Haefner et al., 2013) and evidence accumulation (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007; Drugowitsch et al., 2012) may be of
very broad applicability, and yet most easily approached
through the study of low-level sensory inputs. Many of
these concepts have been developed, inﬂuenced or
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gress, human psychophysics and computational model-
ing have to be combined with many other techniques,
including those yet to be invented.
This point may also be worth emphasizing given
continuing controversy about animal research. Without
invasive physiology, we could still draw some broad
conclusions about the workings of the nervous system
by combining psychophysics and computational analysis
alone, as Young and Helmholtz did so brilliantly in
deducing trichromacy. However, the value of such study
would be far more limited than when it is informed by
animal physiology. Perhaps one day, non-invasive
neuro-imaging techniques will progress to a point where
they can replace invasive animal experiments. However,
that day is far oﬀ. I am arguing the value of human
psychophysics as a complement, certainly not a
replacement, for other approaches.
Perhaps I should give the last word to Fechner, who
as described by Stevens (1957) ‘‘concluded his polemic
of 1877 with a deﬁant ﬁve-line Nachwort’’: ‘‘The tower of
Babel was never ﬁnished because the workers could not
agree on how they should build it; my psychophysical edi-
ﬁce will stand because the workers will never agree on
how to tear it down.’’3 160 years after Fechner’s foundation
of the ﬁeld, his ediﬁce is in ﬁne shape; surrounded by many
other ﬁne buildings, but not remotely under threat of being
torn down.Acknowledgments—My thanks to Bruce Cumming, Ralf Haefner,
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